Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Baker v. Baker : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James P. Cowley; Attorney for Appellee.
Kellie F. Williams; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Baker v. Baker, No. 920314 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4243

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT

K FU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

^202^
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAN BAKER,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 920314-CA
Trial Court No. 914902633DA

LUJUANA BAKER,

Priority Classification 16

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ON OR ABOUT APRIL 16,
1992, THE HONORABLE JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG PRESIDING.

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Appellant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162
JAMES P. COWLEY
Attorney for Appellee
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 532-3333

FILED
AUG101992
um

T. mmm

Clerk 0*«*®*f*_

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN BAKER,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 920314-CA
Trial Court No. 914902633DA

LUJUANA BAKER,

Priority Classification 16

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ON OR ABOUT APRIL 16,
1992, THE HONORABLE JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG PRESIDING.

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Appellant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162
JAMES P. COWLEY
Attorney for Appellee
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 532-3333

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES, ETC. . .

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR
ERRED IN ORDERING THE SALE OF THE MARITAL
RESIDENCE, THUS PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT
AND MINOR CHILDREN FROM REMAINING IN THE
FAMILY HOME

12

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
THE DIVISION OF THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
PENDING SALE

20

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE DEFENDANT
CHILD SUPPORT AT THE LEVEL OF $1,600 PER
MONTH

22

POINT IV:

POINT V:

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $1,400 PER
MONTH AS ALIMONY CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION

27

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL
ESTATE

38

POINT VI: DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

45

CONCLUSION

45

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY

iv
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990)

24,25

Arcrvle v. Arcrvle, 688 P.2d 468 (1984)

44

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991)

28

Cabrera v. Cabrera,
484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977)

17
27,28,35

Florence v. Florence,
400 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
Gardner v. Gardner. 78 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)

16
27,28,29

Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1988)

29

Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991)

29

Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988) . . . .

24

Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

28,37

Peterson v. Peterson. 784 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1988) . . 14,15,16
Pino v. Pino. 418 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) . . 14,16
Sinclair v. Sinclair. 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1987)

44

State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)

3

Wilkins v. Stout. 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1976)

14

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated. Section 30-3-5(1)
Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-2a-3(2) (h)

15
1

Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-45-1

9,23

Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-45-7

11,23,24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont'd.
Rules
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 3
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 8
Other
2 Nelson Divorce and Annulment, (2d Ed. 1961 Rev. Vol.),
Section 14.06, pp.11-12

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN BAKERf
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 920314-CA
Trial Court No. 914902633DA

LUJUANA BAKER,

Priority Classification 16

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT to the above-captioned
matter
counsel,

(hereinafter
and

"defendant"

hereby

submits

or

the

"wife"),

following

by

and

through

as her Brief of

Appellant herein:

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment herein,
which is the Decree of Divorce, is vested in the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules
3

and

4,

and

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

78-2a-3(2)(h).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The matter below is a divorce action and this appeal is from
the final Decree of Divorce and certain provisions of that Decree
of Divorce, heard by the Third Judicial District Court, and, in

particular, those provisions which awarded the marital residence
and other real estate holdings of the parties to the plaintiff
and which awarded alimony and child support and which divided the
property and indebtedness of the parties.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Following

are

the

issues

presented

on

appeal

by

the

defendant herein:
A.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering

the sale of the marital residence and in not permitting the
defendant and minor children to remain in the family home until
the children reached the age of majority?
B.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making its

determination and distribution of the mortgage obligation pending
sale of the marital residence?
C.

Did

the

trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

in

its

determination of the amount of child support?
D.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount

of alimony awarded to the plaintiff?
E.

Did

allocation

of

the

trial

marital

court

property

abuse
and

its
in

discretion

fully

in

recognizing

the
an

alleged debt to the plaintiff's parents?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES. ETC,
There is no case

law authority nor statutory
2

authority

believed by defendant to be wholly dispositive or determinative
of the issues raised on appeal in this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of
discretion standard as to all issues.

The trial court has broad

discretion and so long as that discretion is exercised within the
confines of proper legal standards as set by the appellate courts
of the State of Utah, and so long as the facts and reasons for
the decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the appellate court should not disturb
the resulting order.
The appellate court should review the factual findings of
the trial

judge under the

"clearly erroneous" standard.

A

finding is "clearly erroneous" when "although there is evidence
to support it, the review court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Decree of Divorce
entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County,

State

of

Utah, the

Honorable

Judge

David

S. Young

presiding, which, among other things, entered orders regarding
child support, alimony, the disposition of the marital residence
3

and payment of the mortgage thereon, and the distribution of the
marital estate.
The Decree of Divorce from which the defendant appeals was
signed and entered by the district court on April 16, 1992.

A

Notice of Appeal was timely filed in behalf of the defendant on
or about May 12, 1992.
The plaintiff, or husband, filed for divorce in the lower
court.

Responsive pleadings were filed and the matter came on

for trial without a jury on March 26, 1992.

The trial court

ruled from the bench and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment and Decree of Divorce were prepared pursuant to
that ruling, which were subsequently entered by the Court.

(Said

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are
attached hereto, designated as "Appendix A" and "Appendix B,"
respectively.
Motions for a stay of the order of the trial court pending
appeal were filed by defendant on May 12 and 22, 1992, pursuant
to Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to relieve
the defendant from the effects of the Decree of Divorce awarding
plaintiff the real properties of the parties and oraering the
immediate sale of the marital residence.

Responsive pleadings

were filed and the trial court, by minute entry and subsequent
order, denied defendant's motion to stay.

This motion is now

pending before this Court at the time of drafting of this Brief
of Appellant, but this motion clearly has no effect on the
4

pendency of this appeal, as it is not a motion pursuant to Rule
50a or 50b or 52b or 54b or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married to each other on June 8, 1970.
(FOF 1, index 87)

The parties had three children born as their

issue, two of whom were minors at the time of trial, namely:
Camille Ann Baker, whose date of birth is January 5, 1983, and
who is nine years of age; and Dannie Baker, whose date of birth
is December 6, 1983 and who is eight years of age.
87)

(FOF 2, index

The parties stipulated between themselves, at the time of

trial, to settlement of numerous issues pending before the trial
court, including, but not limited to, custody and visitation.
Defendant was awarded the care, custody and control of the two
minor children.

(FOF 5, index 87)

Defendant's monthly expenses total Five Thousand One Hundred
Ninety-Six
expenses

Dollars
attendant

($5,196.00),
to

which

herself,

her

expenses
two

grandchildren who reside with her in the home.

include

children

and

all
two

(FOF 8, index 88)

The trial court specifically found that the expenses related to
the two grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should they be
considered
support.

in, the trial court's award of alimony and child
(FOF 8, index 88)

At the time of trial, defendant was unemployed, had no
5

income and had not worked since the end of the 1989/1990 school
year.
in

The defendant, however, is a trained and qualified teacher

good

health

and, while

uncertified,

can

re-certify

completion of three (3) academic hours of training.

upon

Defendant

had worked during the majority of the marriage as a teacher or
secretary.

(FOF 7, index 88)

Plaintiff is employed by Pacificorp (TR, p.29, 1.25)
annual

gross

compensation,

including

car

allowance

His
and

anticipated bonuses, is One Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred
Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00), and plaintiff has been the primary
wage-earner during the marriage.

The parties' incomes for the

previous years, including bonuses and relocation reimbursement
are

as

follows:

1990

-

$169,248;

1989

$111,715; 1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149.

-

$120,434; 1988-

(FOF 6, index 87,88)

The pcirties' marital residence at 11718 Eureka Way in South
Jordan, Utah was purchased by the parties in November of 1990
(TR, p.52, 11.13,14)
had

a

value

of

The parties stipulated that the residence

One

Hundred

Eighty-Three

Thousand

Dollars

($183,000.00) at the time of trial and that the mortgage owing
thereon

was

($143,000.00)

One

Hundred

Forty-Three

Thousand

(TR, p.6., 11.6-10), thus leaving an equity of

approximately Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00).
mortgage

obligation,

approximately

Dollars

One

including

Thousand

Six

($1,665.00). (FOF 17, index 92)
6

taxes
Hundred

and

The monthly

insurance,

Sixty-Five

is

Dollars

In

addition

to

the

marital

residence,

the

parties

accumulated and held at the time of trial the following assets:
household furnishings and fixtures; 2-3/4 acres of land in Price,
Utah; 1990 Ford Bronco (operated by defendant); 1989 Ford Bronco
(operated

by

plaintiff);

1991

GMC

truck

(operated

by

plaintiff); two horses; tack for horses; U. S. Savings Bonds; and
garden, power and hand tools.

(FOF 13, index 90)

At trial the

plaintiff testified to the outstanding debts, and provided a
statement

of

assets

and

liabilities

and

suggested

division

thereof, which is designated as "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1" received
by the trial court as illustrative of his testimony and which
exhibit, in its entirety, was adopted as the findings of the
trial court

as to the

assets

equitable division thereof.

and outstanding debts and an

(FOF 13, index 90)

Those debts

include debts on each of the vehicles, two debts entitled "K-Plus
loan number 1" and "K-Plus loan number 2" which then totalled Two
Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars

($2,688.00), a loan

payable to Pacific Power totalling Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Dollars

($6,700.00), a debt to Dr. Hicks in the sum of Five

Hundred Sixty Dollars ($560.00), and a debt to Olivette Furniture
for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).

In addition, set forth

thereon is an item identified as "loan payable to plaintiff's
parents" in the sum of Ninety-Four Thousand Three Hundred EightyNine Dollars ($94,389.00).

(FOF 13, index 91)

outstanding debt, excluding the

The total of

"loan payable to plaintiff's
7

parents" and the vehicle debt, is Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred
Forty-Eight Dollars ($11,948.00).
The trial court found that the item identified as a loan
payable to plaintiff's parents

in the amount of Ninety-Four

Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Nine

Dollars

($94,389.00) is a

marital debt of the parties which must be considered in the
division of the marital estate and which accordingly reduces the
marital net worth of the parties to a negative net worth.
that

debt,

the

lower

court,

adopting

plaintiff's

Given

suggested

division of the marital estate, found that an equitable division
of

the

marital

furnishings

and

estate
fixtures

required

the

to defendant

award

of

one-half

the

and the award of her

vehicle, valued at Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00), with
a debt of Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
thereon.

($14,500.00)

All other marital assets were awarded to plaintiff.

(FOF 13,14, index 90,91)
The trial court found that, because of the substantial debt
of the parties, they could not afford to maintain the residence
at 11718 Eureka Way and that the same must be sold at the
earliest possible time, though the plaintiff was awarded said
property and defendant was permitted temporary possession.
17, index 93)

(FOF

The court also found that it was reasonable,

pending sale, that defendant pay One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00)
of the monthly mortgage until October 1, 1992 and that the
defendant pay the balance, and that if the home was not sold by
8

October 1 the defendant would pay the entire monthly mortgage
obligation.

(FOF 17, index 93)

The court ordered that defendant

would be fully responsible for the mortgage although plaintiff
would be awarded that home, indicating "I want the parties to be
motivated to sell the home so that they can get rid of that
horrendous liability."
The

trial

(TR, p.116, 11.20-22)

court

found

that,

based

upon

defendant's

unemployment and plaintiff's current gross income of One Hundred
Fifty

Thousand

One Hundred

Twenty

Dollars

($150,120.00) per

annum, or Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Ten Dollars ($12,510.00)
per month, reasonable child support for the two children to be
paid

by plaintiff

to defendant

Dollars ($1,600.00) per month.

is One Thousand Six Hundred

"Plaintiff's income level exceeds

the guideline amount set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-45-1, and the court finds One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($1,600.00) to be a reasonable sum."

(FOF 9, index 89)

The trial court found, given the plaintiff's current income
and

the

defendant's

unemployment,

and

given

the

debts

and

expenses of the parties, most of which were to be paid by
plaintiff, and given the needs of plaintiff and defendant, that a
reasonable amount of alimony to be paid by plaintiff to defendant
was One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars
(FOF 9, index 89)

9

($1,400.00) per month.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred or abused its discretion when it
ordered the sale of the marital residence.

The defendant and the

parties' two minor children and one of the parties' grandchildren
had been residing in the home since November of 1990. The court,
in finding that the parties could not afford to maintain and pay
the mortgage payments of approximately One Thousand Six Hundred
Sixty-Five Dollars ($1,665.00) per month, was in error in that
findings of fact indicate otherwise.

Plaintiff's monthly gross

income was assessed at Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Ten Dollars
($12,510.00) and plaintiff was ordered to pay child support and
alimony

to

defendant

($3,000.00) per month.

at the rate of Three Thousand Dollars
Further, the trial court specifically

found that the defendant was an educated, trained and qualified
teacher in the Utah public school system and had worked during
the majority

of

employed

again, thus

yet

the

marriage

and was

contributing

anticipating
further

funds

household to pay the mortgage obligation owing thereon.

becoming
to her
Adequate

income and support was present to maintain that mortgage, thus
permitting the children to remain in the marital residence, thus
serving the best interests of the minor children.
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the award
of the mortgage payments and division of the same pending the
sale of the marital residence.

The court did not have before it

any testimony or evidence to indicate that the defendant would
10

prevent the sale of the residence if ordered by the court, but
ordered that if the residence was not sold by October 1, 1992 she
would be required to pay all of the mortgage indebtedness owing
on the property, even though the property and all equity therein
was awarded to plaintiff.
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the award
of child support at the level of One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($1,600.00) per month.

The court merely accepted the offer of

plaintiff to pay that amount, without due consideration of the
expenses attendant to the children and, therefore, their needs.
The findings were inadequate regarding the appropriate level of
support

when

the

obligor's

income exceeds

the Ten Thousand

Dollars ($10,000.00) combined adjusted gross income set forth in
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.
The trial court erred or abused its discretion in the award
of alimony to defendant at the rate One Thousand Four Hundred
Dollars ($1,400.00) per month.

Given the findings of plaintiff's

expenses and given the findings of the court that plaintiff's
gross

monthly

Dollars

income

($12,500.00),

exceeded
and

Twelve

given

the

Thousand
income

Five

history

Hundred
of

the

plaintiff and the parties and the standard of living enjoyed by
the parties during their marriage, the findings were inadequate
to

support

that

award of One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars

($1,400.00), particularly .

Further, the court erred or abused

its discretion in failing to consider the costs and expenses
11

associated

with

the

plaintiff's

care

of

the

two

minor

grandchildren who were in defendant's care due to the acts and
desires of plaintiff as well as defendant.
The

trial

court

erred or abused

division of the marital estate.

its discretion

in the

Specifically, the court abused

its discretion in fully recognizing the item designated as "loan
payable to plaintiff's parents" which recognition caused the
court to adopt the plaintiff's suggested division of assets and
plaintiff was awarded all marital assets, except one-half the
furnishings and one vehicle.

The resulting award to plaintiff

allows plaintiff to retain all equity in the marital residence,
all equity in the parties' acreage in Price, Utah, two vehicles,
two horses, all tack and items associated with the horses, all
garden, power and hand tools, the U. S. Savings Bonds, and all
funds in plaintiff's possession at the time of trial, excluding
the 401(k) and pension funds, which were divided one-half to each
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

ARGUMENT
POINT 12

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR
ERRED IN ORDERING THE SALE OF THE MARITAL
RESIDENCE, THUS PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT AND
MINOR CHILDREN FROM REMAINING IN THE FAMILY
HOME.

The trial court awarded the marital residence at 11718 South
Eureka Way in South Jordan, Utah to the plaintiff, and ordered
plaintiff to immediately list the same for sale with a real
12

estate broker.

Pending the sale of the subject propertyf the

defendant and the minor children were permitted to reside therein
and care for and maintain the premises.

(DOD 9, index 101)

Though the defendant and minor children, including one of the
grandchildren, had been residing in the residence since November
of

1990, the

court

specifically

found

that because of the

substantial debt of the parties and their resulting negative net
worth, the parties could not afford to maintain and make the
mortgage payments on the residence at 11718 South Eureka Way and
that the same must be sold at the earliest possible time.

(FOF

17, index 93)
At the time of trial, the plaintiff testified that, due to
his work history, multiple moves had been required during the
marriage.
and

the

November

(TR, p.27, 11.21-23)

The defendant testified that she

children

had

been

residing

of

and

that

the children had

neighborhood

1990

in the residence

since

friends in the

and both minor children of the parties attended

Monte Vista School, which is approximately four blocks from the
home.

(TR, p.63, 11.5-17)

The defendant also testified that she

would like to be able to raise the children in the marital
residence because "I believe that they need the stability of not
moving anymore in their life.
about losing their home.

Right now they are very worried

I want them to grow up with friends

like any other normal children in their area.
teachers, dance teachers, classes they attend.
13

They have piano
So that is my

point in asking for the home."

(TR, p.64, 11.1-8)

The defendant

testified that the children had lived in the parties' previously
owned home in Price, Utah twice and lived in New Mexico once, and
that with the move to the current marital residence it was the
fourth move, and that the child, Camille, was only eight years
old.

(TR, p.63, 11.22-24)

Further, the defendant proposed that

the equity be divided fifty percent to each party at the time the
house sold.

(TR, p.64, 11.11-15)

Defendant described the home

as a comfortable home, which has a bedroom for each of the
children and that "what's comfortable about it is that it is in
the country and that it is the way I want the children to be
brought up*"
As

a

(TR, p.71, 11.17-19)

general

rule, courts

have

brought

to bear

their

equitable power to provide for the welfare of children in divorce
decrees.

"Under its equity power to see that the welfare of the

parties, and particularly the children, is best served, the court
can take into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances."
Wilkins v. Stout. 588 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah 1976)
The defendant should be permitted to remain in the family
home until the children reach the age of majority.
up of their parents' marriage is . . .

"'The break

a severe trauma to young

children; this additional physical and psychological dislocation
[from the family home] should not be imposed upon them unless
there is a very good reason indeed for doing so.'"

Peterson v.

Peterson, 784 P.2d 593, 594 (Utah App. 1988), citing Pino v.
14

Pino, 418 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
In Peterson, the Court of Appeals used its broad equitable
powers to award a marital residence to the wife in order that the
children's best interests be served.

In Peterson, the husband

and wife

of marriage.

divorced

after

five years

The only

property involved in the divorce was a three-bedroom house, land
on which the house sat and a washer and dryer, all of which were
brought

into the marriage by the husband.

The trial court

awarded all of the property to the husband and allowed the wife
to reside in the home with the child for a period of only six
months.

The wife, on appeal, argued that the trial court had

abused its discretion in making this award.

Reversing the trial

court, the Court of Appeals looked first to Utah Code Annotated,
Section

30-3-5(1)

(1987), which provides, "When a decree of

divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and parties."

Id.

at 594.

The Court continued, "We construe Utah Code Annotated, Section
30-3-5(1) to mean that not only may the parties' pre-marital
property be subject to division by the court, but the court shall
consider all of the circumstances of the parties determining the
distribution

of

real

and

personal

property,

including

obligations of the parties of child and spousal support."
595.

Id.

the
at

The Court then concluded, "Allowing the children to remain

in the family home would serve their emotional best interests by
maintaining

their

roots

and

security
15

and, thus, helping to

Id.

ameliorate the trauma of divorce."
reason

for

allowing

the children

at 596.

While a primary

to remain in the home in

Peterson was the absence of any other resource in the husband's
possession or control, the Court's concern for the stability and
needs of the children was well articulated.
The Court in Peterson relied on several cases from other
jurisdictions for its holding.

In Florence v. Florence, 400

So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court awarded the
"exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the wife
remarries

or

Id.

emancipated."
had

the

child

reaches

at 1019.

been purchased

by
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or

otherwise

becomes

In that case, the marital residence

the

husband

six months prior to the

parties' marriage.
In

Pino.

supra,

the

trial

court

granted

the

marital

residence to the wife and children for a period of one year only.
This meager allowance was based upon the court's opinion that the
parties could not afford the home.

The appellate court first

explained that any accommodations, even remotely suitable for the
children, would cost at least as much as the current mortgage
payments on the home.

Id.

at 311.

The court then examined the

argument that selling the family home would allow the husband to
pay off a large sum of outstanding debt.
assertion,

the

court

opined

that

Responding to this

children

should

not

dislocated from the marital home absent a very good reason.
at 312.

be
Id.

In the court's view, "indulging his desire to pay off
16

his obligations, however, cannot serve to justify the requirement
that his children be uprooted from the home in which they have
lived for almost all of their lives."

Id.

at 312.

Again, in Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986), the wife challenged the decree of the trial court
which failed to award her the exclusive occupancy of the marital
home.

Responding to the wife's argument, the court explained

that "cases dealing with the issue whether the custodial parent
should be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital
home until the children reach majority or the parent remarries
have

almost

affirmatively."

without
Id.

exception

at 1339.

answered

the

question

In support of this statement the

appellate court offered an extensive string cite.

The court

concluded by once again awarding the wife exclusive occupancy of
the marital home until the child attained the age of majority or
was no longer dependent on his parents.

Id.

at 1340.

It has long been the practice of the judges of the district
courts in the State of Utah to award the custodial parent the use
of the marital residence subject to a lien in favor of the noncustodial parent representing one-half the equity, and subject to
payment of that equity when the youngest child attained the age
of majority or when the house was sold or when the custodial
parent remarried or cohabited.

This equitable division occurs

with frequency, and with such frequency that the case law in Utah
is sparse.

However, the case law cited and statutory authority
17

cited supports the defendant's position that she should have been
awarded

the

use

and

possession

of

the

home

subject

to an

equitable lien in the plaintiff and the "standard contingencies."
In the instant case, the findings of the court reveal sufficient
income

to pay

the mortgage

obligation.

While the mortgage

payments are approximately One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Five
Dollars

($1,665.00) per month, the trial court awarded child

support

and

alimony

at

($3,000.00) per month.

the

rate

of

Three

Thousand

Dollars

Further, the trial court specifically

found that the defendant was an educated, trained and qualified
teacher in the Utah public schools system and had worked during
the majority of the marriage.

It is evident from the findings

that it was anticipated that the defendant would become employed
yet again, and she testified that was her intention.
11.4-6)

(TR, p.70,

It is obvious, therefore, that additional funds would be

available

to

defendant

to

maintain

the

mortgage

and

other

expenses.

While defendant has appealed the trial court's awards

of child support and alimony, even the sum of Three Thousand
Dollars

($3,000.00)

per month, when

augmented

by

additional

income, will allow the defendant to pay the mortgage obligation
even though she may not be living in the standard to which she
became accustomed during the marriage.
As it is evident that there are sufficient funds to pay the
mortgage obligation, the only question remaining is whether the
general debt load of the parties was such that the sale of the
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home is necessary-

In order to answer that question, the Court

need only look at the plaintiff's own testimony as set forth in
"Plaintiff's Exhibit 2" which was received by the trial court
into evidence.

(TR, p.25, 11.19-24)

A copy of that exhibit is

appended hereto, designated as "Appendix C."
That exhibit reveals plaintiff's suggested allocation of his
income, which includes a purported Seven Hundred Fifty Dollar
($750.00) monthly payment to Paul Baker, the alleged debt to his
father.

While the text of the document indicates that the

monthly payment is Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars

($750.00), the

annual payments are indicated on the same document at the rate of
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00), thus indicating a monthly
payment of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) on that debt.

That

exhibit also includes payments on all other debts, both marital
and personal car payments.

The exhibit, on its face, relies upon

plaintiff paying child support at the rate of One Thousand Six
Hundred Dollars

($1,600.00) per month, as was ordered by the

trial court, and alimony at the rate of One Thousand Four Hundred
Dollars ($1,400.00) per month, as was ordered by the trial court.
The

exhibit

then

shows

that

plaintiff

will

have

net

cash

available to him, after payment of all of his debts, of Two
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Four Dollars ($2,834.00) per month.
Again, by plaintiff's own exhibit and testimony, adequate funds
exist to maintain all debt, and the court erred or abused its
discretion in finding that there were inadequate funds to pay the
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mortgage and in then ordering the sale of the marital residence.
As adequate* funds existed to pay the mortgage obligation as well
as all other debts, the sale of the residence was not necessary,
and it would serve the emotional best interests of the children
in this matter to preserve their home and environment and prevent
their physical and psychological dislocation.

This Court should

award the use and possession of the marital residence to the
defendant until the children attain their majority or until the
defendant's remarriage or cohabitation.

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE
DIVISION OF THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS PENDING
SALE.
The trial court ordered that, commencing with the month of
April and continuing through the month of September 1992, or
until the property was

sold

(whichever occurred

first), the

defendant was to pay One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) of the
monthly mortgage obligation and the plaintiff was to pay the
balance.

The court further ordered that if the property was not

sold by the end of September, the defendant was to make the full
monthly mortgage payment commencing with the month of October and
until the same was sold.

(DOD 9, index 101)

The court's only

explanation as to that order and allocation of the debt was "I
want the peirties to be motivated to sell the home so that they
can get rid of that horrendous liability."

(TR, p.116, 11.20-22)

The court also reduced the alimony that plaintiff would pay to
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defendant during the time that he was making contributions to the
mortgage

to

the

sum

of

($1,200.00) per month.

One

Thousand

Two

(DOD 5, index 99)

Hundred

Dollars

The plaintiff had

previously testified on direct that he had no objection to the
defendant

and

the

minor

residence until its sale.

children

remaining

in

the

marital

It was his position, however, that she

should pay the mortgage owing pending the sale of that property.
(TR, p.17, 11.18-22)
Nowhere in the evidence or testimony did there appear any
indication that the defendant would obstruct or prevent the sale
of the marital residence, warranting the trial court's order that
the defendant should bear the entire mortgage payment if the home
did not sell by October 1, 1992.

Given that plaintiff's monthly

income is in excess of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($12,500.00), and given that the defendant, at the time of trial,
was unemployed,
support

and

and

alimony

given the trial court's
at

the

rate

award of child

of Three Thousand

Dollars

($3,000.00) per month, and given the defendant's monthly income
and

expenses,

including

the mortgage, of

approximately

Five

Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00), that court
order serves as a punishment of the defendant, rather than a
motivation and was not supported by any evidence or findings of
fact.

Potentially, if the market failed to permit a timely sale

of the property, the defendant would have to continue making the
entire mortgage payment on an asset that the trial court awarded
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to plaintiff, including all equity therein.

If the Court finds

no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its
award of the property to the plaintiff or the trial court's order
that the home be sold, then this Court should order that the
plaintiff continue to assist in the maintenance of the mortgage
obligation until the home is sold.

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT CHILD SUPPORT AT THE
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS
($1,600.00) PER MONTH.
The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay to defendant,
as and for child support for the two minor children, the sum of
One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month.

That

level of support was offered to be paid by plaintiff to defendant
during his direct testimony and in "Plaintiff's Exhibit 2."
p. 24,

11.1-3)

Defendant

testified

that

One

Thousand

(TR,
Seven

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,750.00) would be necessary for the care
of the children.

(TR, p.84, 11.21 to p.85, 1.1)

Prior to

testifying to that need for support, the defendant testified as
to her monthly

income and expenses

and offered

"Defendant's

Exhibit 5," which exhibit illustrated those expenses and which
exhibit was received by the court.
of

(TR, p.66, 11.13-20)

A copy

"Defendant's Exhibit 5" is appended hereto, designated as

"Appendix D."

That exhibit reveals monthly expenses of Four

Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars ($4,800.00), excluding defendant's
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car payment, which is Three Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($396.00)
per month, for a total monthly expense of Five Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00).
payment

listed

thereon

is

approximately

However, the mortgage
Seventy-Four

Dollars

($74.00) less than the actual monthly mortgage later testified to
and as later found by the court.

(TR, p.116, 11.6-9)

The trial court, in awarding the One Thousand Six Hundred
Dollars ($1,600.00) per month support found that, based upon the
total gross compensation of the plaintiff of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00), and further
premised and predicated upon the fact that defendant is currently
unemployed and currently has no income, reasonable child support
to be paid by plaintiff to defendant for the benefit of the two
children is One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
month.

($1,600.00) per

The income level of the plaintiff exceeded the guideline

amount set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-1 and the
court found One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) to be a
reasonable sum.

(FOF 9, index 88-89)

As plaintiff's income exceeds the highest level specified in
Utah's child support obligation table, the court must order "
an appropriate and just child support amount."
Annotated, Section 78-45-7.12.

See, Utah Code

That statute specifically states

only that the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
highest level specified in the table for the number of children
due support.

In the instant case, there are two children and the
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level set forth in the base combined child support obligation is
One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00). See, Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-45-7.14.
An "appropriate and just" child support award requires an
examination of the factors listed in Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-45-7.3.

Those relevant factors are listed as follows:

(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor and the
child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the
obligee for the support of others.
An appropriate examination of each of those factors would be
evidenced by findings entered by the court.
Allred, 797 P.2d

1108 (Utah App. 1990).

See, Allred v.

In Allred, the Utah

Court of Appeals discussed how a trial court should apply Section
78-45-7.

First, "[s]ection 78-45-7 requires the trial court to

consider at

least

findings on all

the seven factors listed . . . [and to] enter
of the factors."

v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911.

Id.

at 1111, citing Jefferies

(Utah App. 1988)

Second, the

court's failure to enter findings is reversible error "unless the
undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on
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which the findings are missing,"

Allred, supra,

at 1111. Third,

adequate findings require sufficient detail to demonstrate the
steps by which the court reached its ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue. Allred, supra,

at 1111.

The Utah Court of Appeals found that the trial court's
findings in Allred were inadequate.

The crux of this inadequacy

was the trial court's failure to answer "the critical question of
the total amount needed for Cory's monthly support."
supra,

at 1111.

Allred,

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals was unable to

determine how the trial court reached its conclusions, other than
through a figure "the parties previously stipulated."
supra,

Allred,

at 1111.
In

the

inadequate.

instant

case,

the

findings

of

the

court

are

The court merely states that the level of support is

reasonable, but there are no findings regarding the children's
needs.

The

findings

are

inadequate

in

that

they

fail to

demonstrate any of the steps by which the court did reach its
ultimate conclusion and, pursuant to Allred, the failure of the
court to enter findings is reversible error.
While defendant requested support based upon a percentage
formula

(14% of the gross income of the plaintiff) there is

nothing in our current statutory law which suggests that the
trial

court

should

existing table.

use

a

mathematical

continuation

of

the

The trial court is required, however, by our

statutory law as interpreted and discussed in Allred, to consider
25

the

needs

of

the

children

and

to carefully

articulate

findings upon which the court's conclusion is based.

the

Plaintiff

did not articulate his reasoning for offering the One Thousand
Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month child support award,
and the court failed to detail or demonstrate its reasoning in
the findings of the court.
In addition to inadequate findings, the court's award of
support is simply too low and not justified given the monthly
needs and expenses of the plaintiff in caring for the children as
testified to by her, and given the high income level of the
plaintiff.

As defendant's monthly expenses are in excess of Five

Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00) and the trial
court

awarded

alimony

of

One Thousand

Four Hundred

Dollars

($1,400.00) per month, the defendant has a shortfall of Three
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars
support

at

the

rate

of

One

Thousand

($3,796.00).
Six

Hundred

Child
Dollars

($1,600.00) per month does not ameliorate that shortfall and the
plaintiff still has net income available to him each molnth of
over Two Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Dollars ($2,830.00).

The

needs of the children and the plaintiff's ability to pay was
simply not considered by the court and the amount ordered is
insufficient and an abuse of discretion.
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POINT IV:

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,400.00) PER MONTH AS
ALIMONY CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE INADEQUATE TO
SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD AND THE ALIMONY AWARD IS
INADEQUATE.
The

trial

court

awarded

the

defendant

the

sum of One

Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400-00) per month as and for
alimony, after the sale of the marital residence or commencing
with October 1992, whichever first occurred.

(DOD 5, index 99)

The court made the alimony permanent and based it upon the
plaintiff's current income and the fact that the defendant is not
currently employed and is without income and given the debts and
expenses of the parties, most of which must be paid by the
plaintiff, and given the needs of the plaintiff and defendant,
reasonable

alimony

was

($1,400.00) per month.

One

Thousand

Four

Hundred

Dollars

(FOF 9, index 89)

"An alimony award should

. . .

to the extent possible,

equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage."

Gardner v. Gardner. 78 P.2d 1076,

1081 (Utah 1988).
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the Supreme
Court

of

Utah

established

the basic purpose of alimony and

delineated the three factors which must be considered in making
an alimony award.

The Utah Supreme Court held that "the purpose

of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict
27

Id.

punitive damages on the husband."
Divorce and Annulment
pp. 11-12.

at 411, quoting 2 Nelson

(2d Ed. 1961 Rev. Vol.), Section 14.06

This support was to be sufficient to enable the wife

to enjoy the same standard of living as she enjoyed before the
divorce.
"criteria

English, supra,
considered

at 411.

in

support and maintenance
needs

of

the wife; the

The court then explained that

determining

a

reasonable

award

for

include the financial conditions and
ability

of

the wife

to

produce a

sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the husband to
provide support.

English, supra,

at 411-412.

The three factors enunciated in English are now mandatory
and must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

Further, the

trial court must enter findings as to each factor.

See, Bell v.

Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991).

"The trial court must make

sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a
reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary
determination was rationally based upon these three factors."
Id.

at 492.
In determining an alimony award, trial courts should attempt

to leave the parties with nearly equal standards of living.
Gardner, supra,

at 1081.

In Gardner the husband was a surgeon

earning Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) per month at the time of
the parties' divorce.

The wife was unemployed.

the parties were equally divided between the two.
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All assets of
There were no

significant liabilities.

The court awarded One Thousand Two

Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) per month to the wife as alimony, to
be reduced to Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month when she
became qualified to receive social security.

In overturning the

alimony award as an abuse of discretion, the Court expressly
stated that the wife was entitled to a standard of living as
close as possible to the standard of living she enjoyed while
married.

Gardner, supra,

at 1081.

806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991).

See, also, Howell v. Howell,
"It follows that if the payor

spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to
provide

for only basic needs, but should

recipient spouse's 'station in life.'"

also consider the

Howell, supra, at 1212,

quoting Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1988).

In

Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
disagreed with the husband's argument that the court abused its
discretion in awarding alimony where the husband was left with
ample resources, "to provide himself with what is very likely to
be a far more luxurious standard of living than his wife will
enjoy."

Id.

at 649.

As indicated at the time of trial, the plaintiff's annual
gross income, including car allowance and anticipated bonuses,
was

One

Hundred

Fifty

Thousand

One

Hundred

Twenty

Dollars

($150,120.00), which is an average gross monthly income of Twelve
Thousand Five Hundred Ten Dollars ($12,510.00).

The court found

that the plaintiff had been the primary wage-earner during the
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marriage and that the parties' income from the previous years,
including bonuses and relocation reimbursements were as follows:
1990

-

$169,248;

1989

-

$92,674; 1986 - $76,149.

$120,434;

1988

-

$111,715; 1987-

(FOF 6, index 87-88)

The court also found that the defendant's monthly expenses,
including the expenses attendant to herself, the two children and
the two grandchildren residing in her home, were Five Thousand
One Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($5,196.00).

The court awarded

the plaintiff both of the vehicles he requested and ordered him
to pay all of the debts.

(DOD 14, 15, index 103, 104) As shown

on

2," the payment

"Plaintiff's

Exhibit

on plaintiff's

GMC

vehicle is Four* Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars ($452.00) per month and
the payment on plaintiff's

Bronco is Two Hundred

Sixty-Four

Dollars ($264.00) per month, for total car payments by plaintiff
each month of Seven Hundred Sixteen Dollars ($716.00).

That is

an annual expense to plaintiff of Eight Thousand Five Hundred
Ninety-Two Dollars ($8,592.00).

He also has a monthly payment to

Olivette Furniture at the rate of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00)
and

a

balance

owing

of

approximately

Two

Thousand

Dollars

($2,000.00), which will be paid off in approximately ten months.
Plaintiff

also has two K-Plus

ordered to pay.

loans set forth which he was

Loan number one is to be paid at the rate of One

Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($135.00) per month and the balance
owing at the time of trial was One Thousand Seven Hundred SixtyTwo Dollars ($1,762.00).

The loan would then be paid in full in
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approximately one year.

Loan number two is to be paid at the

rate of Fifty-Seven Dollars ($57.00) per month, and the balance
owing at the time of trial was approximately Nine Hundred TwentySix Dollars ($926.00), which loan should be paid off within two
years.

There was also listed a debt to Dr. Hicks of Five Hundred

Sixty Dollars ($560.00), payable Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) per
month.

Obviously,

extinguished

that

immediately

debt

could

be

with plaintiff's

paid
income

in

full

and

level.

In

addition, there is a debt to Pacific Power having a principal
balance

of

Six

Thousand

Seven

Hundred

Dollars

($6,700.00),

payable at the rate of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month.
At

that

rate,

that

loan

approximately two years.

should

be

paid

in

full

within

The only other debt and obligation

listed as a marital debt and found by the court to be a marital
debt was the debt identified as "loan payable to Mr. and Mrs.
Paul Baker."

(DOD 15, index 104)

As more thoroughly discussed

in Point V below, few payments have been made on that loan.

See

"Defendant's Exhibit 3" received by the court (TR, p.35, 11.2224) which is appended hereto, designated as "Appendix E."

That

principal debt is listed at Ninety-Four Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty-Nine

Dollars

($94,389.00).

The monies were borrowed

commencing in 1984 and payments made by plaintiff to his parents
since that time have totalled Three Thousand Nine Hundred TwentyFive Dollars ($3,925.00).

(TR, p.35, 11.17-24)

In addition,

there is no promissory note or other contract evidencing that
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debt and no interest is being paid.
1.6)

(TR, p.42, 1.17 to p.43,

Even if this Court upholds the trial court's finding that

this is a legitimate debt and, therefore, should be considered in
the allocation of the marital assets and monies, the Court must
also note the minimal payments that have been made in infrequent
and small amounts since 1984 in assessing the amount of money
available

to the plaintiff to pay alimony to defendant.

On

"Plaintiff's Exhibit 2" he has allocated Twelve Thousand Dollars
($12,000.00) per year as payment on that non-interest-bearing
debt.

At no time in the history of the debt has plaintiff made

any such payments, and there is no requirement within the Decree
or Findings that any particular payments be made on that debt.
The nature of that debt must be considered in the award of
alimony.

Again, however, regardless of the legitimacy of that

debt, if the court allocates One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per
month

from plaintiff's

gross

income and allocates

a monthly

amount for the other marital debts, excluding his car payments,
those monthly totals would be as follows:

Olivette Furniture-

$200.00; K-Plus Loan 1 - $135.00; K-Plus Loan 2 - $57.00; Dr.
Hicks - $25.00; Pacific Power - $400.00; loan payable to Mr. and
Mrs. Paul Baker - $1,000.
Hundred Seventeen Dollars

The total is One Thousand Eight
($1,817.00).

If the court reduces

plaintiff's gross monthly income of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred
Ten Dollars ($12,510.00) by that monthly debt load, his monthly
gross

income

is

then

Ten Thousand
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Six Hundred

Ninety-Three

Dollars ($10,693.00).
Other than one-half of the household furnishings and onehalf of the retirement funds, the only asset awarded to defendant
was her 1990 Ford Bronco, which has a debt of Fourteen Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00) and has an assessed value of
Seventeen Thousand Dollars
Defendant's

monthly

Dollars ($396.00).

($17,000.00).

car payment

(FOF 13, index 90)

is Three

Hundred

Ninety-Six

Excluding, therefore, those car payments as

being debts now personal to the individuals receiving the asset,
defendant's monthly income is zero, without child support or
alimony, and plaintiff's gross monthly income is Ten Thousand Six
Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars ($10,693.00).

After payment of the

child support ordered by the trial court, defendant will then
have

monthly

income

of

One

Thousand

Six

Hundred

Dollars

($1,600.00) and plaintiff will have a gross monthly income of
Nine Thousand Ninety-Three Dollars ($9,093.00).

If the plaintiff

pays

Hundred

monthly

alimony

of

One

Thousand

Four

Dollars

($1,400.00), and if the wife dedicates all of the child support
award of One Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) per month
to the children, she will then be left with One Thousand Four
Hundred

Dollars

($1,400.00),

gross, per month

to cover her

expenses and plaintiff will then have Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Sixty-Three Dollars ($7,663.00), gross, per month to cover his
expenses.

Again, that is assuming that plaintiff is actually

going to take One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per month out of
33

his gross

income and pay it to his parents •

Even if the

defendant becomes as a public school teacher at an annual income
of, say, Twenty-Four Thousand Dollars ($24,000.00), she will then
have Three Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($3,400.00) gross income
per month

and

plaintiff will

still have Seven Thousand Six

Hundred Sixty-Three Dollars ($7,663.00) per month after paying
his mother and father One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per month.
In addition, the defendant will pay all of the current marital
debts, again excluding the vehicle debts and excluding the debt
payable to his parents, within two years.

He would then have an

additional Eight Hundred Seventeen Dollars ($817.00) available
per month for his monthly needs and expenses.
It is impossible, given the foregoing facts, which were
known to the trial court at the time of trial and which are set
forth in the

findings, to in any way equalize the parties'

standards of living with the alimony award.

The award will

permit the plaintiff to continue with his luxurious "station in
life" and will allow him to continue an expensive lifestyle,
including race horses (TR, p.77, 1.11 to p.78., 1.16), while the
defendant will be entitled to only a modest standard of living.
The parties have enjoyed a comfortable standard of living for the
last several years.
89)

(TR, p.70, 1.21 to p.71, 1.21; FOF 6, index

The parties were married 22 years and the evidence presented

to the court was that the defendant did not further her career in
order to continue moving and to further the plaintiff's career.
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(TR, p.27f

1.21 to p.28, 1.9; TR, p. 85, 1.20 to p. 86, 1.14)

Defendant testified, and plaintiff admitted, that defendant had
to change employment each time the plaintiff's work required a
move.

Defendant requested an award of alimony at the rate of Two

Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per month.
The

court

awarded

the

alimony

offered

(TR, p.85, 11.18-20)
by plaintiff

in his

testimony and exhibits of One Thousand Four Hundred Dollars
($1,400.00) per month.

Given the facts and circumstances, the

previous standard of living, the plaintiff's ability to earn
income, the defendant's ability to earn income and her needs, and
given the length of the marriage and what the defendant has given
up to assist the plaintiff in pursuing his career, the inequity
of the alimony award herein needs little explanation.
In reaching its decision, the trial court failed to enter
adequate findings as to the plaintiff's ability to pay alimony.
In making the award the court stressed that the plaintiff emerged
from the divorce carrying a significant debt burden.
index 90,91)

(FOF 13,14,

As explained above, after payment of that debt

burden, the plaintiff emerges with a gross monthly income of over
Six Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars ($6,660.00), while the
defendant is left with an alimony award of One Thousand Four
Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00).

For this reason, the court abused

its discretion and the alimony award should be reversed and the
court

should

enter

an

alimony

based

upon

circumstances outlined in English v. English,
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the

supra.

facts

and

B. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED ALL OF DEFENDANT'S
EXPENSES, INCLUDING
THOSE ATTENDANT
TO THE
GRANDCHILDREN AND THE HOME.
The trial court found that the expenses related to the two
grandchildren in the home of the defendant were not relevant to,
nor should they be considered in, the court's award of alimony
and child support.

(FOF 8, index 88)

At the time of trial, the

plaintiff testified that the parties' granddaughter, Lacey, had
been living with the parties for approximately five years, since
she was a few months of age.

(TR, p.43, 11.16-25)

The plaintiff

testified that the child called plaintiff both grandpa and daddy.
(TR,

p. 44,

11.6-7)

At

the

time

of

trial, the

plaintiff

acknowledged that the parties' grandson, Christopher, also lived
with the defendant and the parties' children.

(TR, p.46, 11.7-9)

The defendcint testified that she lived in the marital residence
with the two children and with the two grandchildren Christopher
and Lacey and that Lacey had resided with her and her husband
since the child's third month of life.
p. 62, 11.7-11)

(TR, p.61, 11.20-22,

The grandson, Christopher, has resided with her

since January 1991.

(TR, p.62, 11.1,2)

Plaintiff's counsel

objected to any testimony regarding the grandchildren on the
basis of irrelevancy and immateriality and the court sustained
that objection.

Defendant's counsel proffered that if defendant

would have been permitted to testify she would have testified
that plaintiff encouraged defendant to take both grandchildren
into the home and encouraged the defendant to stay home and not
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work and to take care of the children in her home.

She also

would have testified that their grandchild, Lacey, knows the
parties

as

grandparents.

her

mother

and

father,

rather

than

as

her

Further, defendant would have testified that the

grandchildren will continue in her home and that she will incur
additional expense due to the fact that those children are in her
home.

(TR, pp.89, 1.19 to p. 90, 1.9)

There is no case law in

the State of Utah which is on point to this issue.

The defendant

does not contend that the plaintiff owes a duty of child support
for the grandchildren in defendant's home.

Defendant contends,

however, that the plaintiff's request and encouragement that the
children live with the parties and requirement that the defendant
stay home and care for these minor grandchildren, and the fact
that she then incurred significant expenses attendant to the care
of those two children is pertinent to the issue of alimony.

It

is defendant's position and belief that the court erred in not
permitting the testimony relating to the expenses attendant to
the grandchildren as those expenses are one of three factors to
be considered pursuant to Jones v. Jones, supra.
the

expenses

appropriately

considered

because

Not only are
they are real

expenses that are currently being incurred, but also because the
reason for their incurrence was the instigation and encouragement
of the plaintiff, who has now left the marital residence and
washed his hands of the situation.
to

consider

those

expenses

and

Since the trial court failed
needs, the
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issue

should be

remanded for determination of the needs and the appropriate level
of alimony based upon those needs.

POINT V:

The

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL
ESTATE.

trial

court

awarded

the defendant

one-half

furnishings and fixtures at the marital residence.

of the

The trial

court also awarded the defendant the 1990 Ford Bronco that had
been operated by her during the marriage.

The court assessed the

value of that Bronco at Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00)
and acknowledged a debt on the same of Fourteen Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars

($14,500.00) .

The court assigned a value of

Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) to each party's one-half of
the furnishings and fixtures.

(FOF 13, index 90)

There was no

testimony at the time of trial regarding any of the furnishings
or any of them having any particular value.

There was no

testimony regarding any particular painting, piece of jewelry,
fur, couch or any like object.

The Fifteen Thousand Dollar

($15,000.00) for each party's one-half of the furnishings and
fixtures was taken from the proposal and exhibit of the plaintiff
received by the court, "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1," and was accepted
by the court as a finding.

(TR, p. 17, 11.1-7)

exhibit is attached hereto as "Appendix F."

A copy of that

Deducting the debt

on the Bronco from the value assessed, defendant was left with a
net estate of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).
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The

trial court awarded the plaintiff the residence at 11718 South
Eureka

Way

with

a

net

equity

of

Forty

Thousand

Dollars

($40,000.00), the two and three-quarter acres of land in Price,
Utah, which was unencumbered and assigned a value of Six Thousand
Dollars

($6,000.00),

the

1991

GMC vehicle, the

1989 Bronco

vehicle, a two-year old filly assessed at a value of Two Thousand
Dollars ($2,000.00) and a horse by the name of D. B. Cooper,
assessed

at

($1,500.00).

a

value

of

One

Thousand

Five

Hundred

Dollars

The trial court also awarded the plaintiff all

garden, power and hand tools, the tack for the horses and U. S.
Savings Bonds valued at Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00).

The court

acknowledged and accepted the plaintiff's testimony regarding the
values of each of the items even though the plaintiff never
offered the basis for his valuations set forth on his Exhibit 1.
The only explanation of the document and the basis for the
valuation was articulated by plaintiff's counsel and a proffer
accepted by the court indicating that "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1" and
the

statement

of

assets

and

liabilities was

prepared under

counsel's supervision and direction and that it contained all of
the assets and liabilities of which plaintiff had any knowledge
and contained a proposed division and his suggested division and
that it would be his testimony if plaintiff were called to
testify about the exhibit.

(TR, p.16, 11.18-25)

Defendant

provided her own schedule of assets, which was designated as
"Defendant's Exhibit 7" and which was received by the court.
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(TR, p.83, 1.20 to p.84, 1.4)
is

attached

defendant's

hereto

and

A copy of "Defendant's Exhibit 7"

designated

schedule of marital

as

"Appendix

G."

The

assets is incorrectly titled

"Plaintiff's Proposed Property Division," but that exhibit is
truly defendant's proposed property division.

The values of the

vehicles and the debts vary from those given by plaintiff.

In

addition, the defendant's schedule does not include the debt set
forth on "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1" as "loan payable to plaintiff's
parents."

All other items, assets and debts are listed.

With no

findings or explanation, the court adopted the division of assets
and liabilities set forth on "Plaintiff's Exhibit 1," except for
an item listed as a liability to defendant's parents on page two
of that exhibit.

(TR, p.117, 11.11-17)

That exhibit was adopted

as a finding of the court. (FOF 13, index 90)
no

findings

by

the court

as to why

Again, there were

the court adopted the

valuations of the plaintiff as opposed to the valuations of the
defendant on the values of the vehicle, the debts then owing or
the values of the U. S. Savings Bonds, and the court erred in not
providing
property

adequate
and

findings

the values

as

to that division

thereof

and

the exact

of marital
debts

owing

thereon.
In addition, the court in its findings allocated the debt
entitled "loan payable to plaintiff's parents" to the plaintiff
and specifically stated:
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The obligation set forth in subparagraph 14(r) of
paragraph 14 [sic] above, which is a loan repayable to
the plaintiff's parents in the amount of $94,389.00
(which does not include any interest), is a marital
debt of the parties which must be considered in the
division of the marital estate and which accordingly
reduces the marital net worth of the parties to a
negative net worth. The debt was incurred from time to
time commencing in 1984 and some payments have been
made thereon as evidence by Defendant's Exhibit 3.
Since plaintiff is charged with the responsibility for
repayment of that debt to plaintiff's parents, the
division of the marital net worth, as provided for in
Paragraph 14 above, leaves the plaintiff with a
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets
being awarded to the defendant have a positive net
worth of $17,500.00. The Court finds this imbalance to
be necessary and equitable because the plaintiff is the
only party who has earnings with which the liabilities
of the parties, as set forth in Paragraph 14 [sic]
above, can be paid. (FOF 14, index 91,92)
At the trial, plaintiff testified that "Defendant's Exhibit
3" was an accurate representation of payments made on the alleged
loan

from plaintiff's

parents.

(TR, p.35, 11.12-16)

That

exhibit shows payments made in the sum of Three Thousand Nine
Hundred

Twenty-Five

Dollars

($3,925.00).

The exhibit

shows

eleven payments having been made in 1984, two payments in 1985,
two payments in 1987, two payments in 1988, and one payment in
1991.

While plaintiff testified that defendant knew about the

monies being borrowed from his parents (TR, p.36, 11.4-10), the
defendant vehemently denied any knowledge of those loans or any
debt owing to plaintiff's parents until the divorce action was
filed.

(TR, p.72, 1.24 to p. 73, 1.13; p.75, 11.7-13; p.76, 1.21

to p.77, 1.10)
The plaintiff testified that he earned more in succeeding
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years than he did in 1984.

(TR, p.38, 11.10-25)

plaintiff

Sixty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred

earned

One Hundred

While the

Forty-Eight Dollars ($169,248.00) in 1990 (FOF 6, index 88), he
made no payments in 1990. Being questioned as to why no payments
were made, the plaintiff stated, "I had extreme debt.
(TR, p.38, 11.19-21)

No money."

While plaintiff admitted that his current

gross income per annum is One Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred
Twenty Dollars ($150,120.00) and the court found the same (FOF 2,
index 87), the plaintiff made only one payment in December of
1991, six months after the complaint for divorce was filed.
p.38, 11.22-25)

(TR,

Although plaintiff received a Twelve Thousand

Dollar ($12,000.00) bonus in 1991, none of that money was paid to
his parents.

(TR, p.39, 11.6-10)

Although plaintiff received a

relocation payment in 1990 of approximately Twenty-Four Thousand
Dollars ($24,000.00), no payments were made to his parents.
p.39, 11.11-21)

(TR,

In 1988, when the parties earned One Hundred

Eleven Thousand Seven Hundred Fifteen Dollars ($111,715.00) (FOF
6, index 88), the plaintiff paid his parents Six Hundred Dollars
($600.00) (Defendant's Exhibit 3).

In 1987, when the parties

earned Ninety-Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars (FOF
6,

index

88), the plaintiff

paid his parents

Dollars ($700.00) (Defendant's Exhibit 3).
parties

earned

Seventy-Six

Thousand

One

Seven Hundred

In 1986, when the
Hundred

Forty-Nine

Dollars ($76,149.00) (FOF 6, index 88), no payments were made to
plaintiff's parents.

(Defendant's Exhibit 3)
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There exists no

promissory note or written contract evidencing this loan.
is no interest accruing on the alleged loan.

There

(TR, p.42, 1.20 to

p.43, 1.1)
While plaintiff testified that he and defendant owe NinetyFour Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-Nine Dollars ($94,389.00) to
plaintiff's

mother

and

father

(TR, p.21, 11.2-8),

all

the

evidence indicates that there are no arrangements for payment,
there is no enforceable note, that few payments have been made,
and little or no payments were made in those years when the
plaintiff and defendant had the most resources to pay and large
lump sums of money from which to pay.

The trial court awarded

that debt to the plaintiff and, ostensibly, in return awarded him
all of the real property of the parties and the majority of the
personal property of the parties.

This included acreage in

Price, Utah, the down payment for the acquisition of which came
from defendant's family.

(TR, p.98, 11.13-22)

The trial court did not order the plaintiff to use the
proceeds

from the sale of the marital residence to pay his

parents.

The trial court did not order the plaintiff to sell the

parties' assets, including the race horses awarded to plaintiff,
to pay the debt to his parents.

In fact, the court makes no

order relating to the maintenance of that debt.

The end result

of the order of the court is that plaintiff is receiving almost
all of the marital assets and will likely not pay the debt he
alleges he owes to his parents.

Again, the facts simply do not
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support

his

payments

allegations

to his

that

he will

suddenly

start making

father at the rate of One Thousand Dollars

($1,000.00) per month.

The only payment that he made since March

of 1988 was one payment in December of 1991 after the instant
litigation was commenced.

While the division of the marital

property and "perforce of marital debts is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed by
this court absent a clear abuse of discretion,"
Sinclair,

718 P.2d

396, 398, (Utah

Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (1984).

Sinclair v.

1987), citing Aravle v.

"The law contemplates a fair and
Id.

equitable, not an equal, division of the marital debts."

at

398.
The

ireality

of many

marriages

is that

support and funds for their children.

parents

provide

It is not uncommon for

"debts owed to parents" to come to the fore when a divorce is
filed.

At the time of pre-trial on this matter before the

Honorable Domestic Relations Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.,
the

Commissioner

noted

in

his

minute

entry

that

"the

commissioner's experience is that many of these debts were not
intended to be paid back when the money was provided by parents
and that, absent evidence to the contrary, each party should be
ordered to assume and pay the debt owing to his or her family."
(Minute Entry dated 2/10/92, paragraph 4, index 73)

This Court

may find the alleged debt to be a debt as the trial court did,
but the court, as a court of equity, must do justice to the
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defendant and to the marital estate.
done equity.

The trial court has not

The trial court has awarded the marital estate to

the plaintiff and has left the defendant without substantial
assets.

After 22 years of marriage, plaintiff can continue

living comfortably with virtually all of the marital assets, and
defendant is left without a job, without sufficient support and
with no assets or home to live in and no funds of money with
which to purchase a home.

The trial court has indeed abused its

discretion and done injustice in this case.

The division of the

marital estate should be set aside and the defendant's proposed
property division as set forth in Exhibit 7 should be adopted by
the court as being a fair and equitable division of the marital
assets and debt.
POINT VI: DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS.
Based upon the foregoing and based upon plaintiff's income
and defendant's

lack of income and her needs, the defendant

respectfully moves

the above-entitled

court

for an award of

attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

this

Court

should

award

possession of the marital residence to the defendant pending the
children attaining their majority.

If the Court does not award

possession of the marital residence to defendant, this Court
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should re-allocate the mortgage obligation owing thereon pending
sale of the* same.

Further, this matter should be remanded to the

trial court to take evidence and to make adequate findings as to
the issues of child support and alimony and this Court should
make an equitable division of the marital estate or remand the
matter to the trial court to make an equitable division of the
marital estate with the direction and assistance of this Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 10th day of August, 1992.
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James P. Cowley (073 9)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50- South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
S a l t Lake City, Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3
I N THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAN BAKER,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
LUJUANA BAKER,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 914902633DA
Judge David S. Young

The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young,
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on
Thursday, March 2 6, 19 92.
Exhibits were received.
on the record.

The parties were sworn and testified.
The parties entered into a stipulation

Based on the foregoing and based upon the

matters on file herein, the Court now makes and enters its
FINDINGS QF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are both actual and

bonafide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and were
g:\wpl\213\00001bsr.W51

for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the
commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each

other on June 8, 1970.
3.

There are irreconcilable differences between the

parties making a continuation of the marital relationship
impossible.
4.

Three (3) children have been born as issue of

this marriage.

One (1) of the children is beyond her eighteenth

(18th) birthday.

Two (2) of the children are minors and reside

with the Defendant.

Their names, birthdays and ages are as

follows:

Camille Ann born Jan. 5, 1983, 9 years of age
Dannie born December 6, 1983, 8 years of age
5.

The Defendant i s a good mother and the care,

custody and control of the two (2) minor children should be
awarded t o the Defendant, reserving t o t h e P l a i n t i f f t h e r i g h t
t o v i s i t with said c h i l d r e n a t a l l reasonable times and places.
6.

The P l a i n t i f f i s employed and his c u r r e n t annual

gross compensation, i n c l u d i n g car allowance and a n t i c i p a t e d
bonuses, i s $150, 120. 00.

The P l a i n t i f f has been t h e primary

wage e a r n e r during t h e marriage.

The p a r t i e s ' incomes for the

previous years, i n c l u d i n g bonuses and r e l o c a t i o n reimbursement,
-2g:\wpl\213\00001bsr.W51

are as follows:

1990 - $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 -

$111,715; 1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149.
7.

The Defendant is an educated, trained and

qualified teacher in the Utah public school system and she is in
good health.

She last worked and last taught a full contract

year for the school year 1989-1990.

She has worked during the

majority of the parties' marriage as a school teacher or
secretary.

She is currently uncertified, but can recertify upon

completion of three (3) academic hours of training which she can
readily obtain between now and the beginning of the 1992-1993
school year.

The Defendant is currently unemployed and

presently has no income.
8.

The Defendant testified that her monthly expenses

are $4,800.00 per month, excluding her car payment which is
$396.00, for a total of $5,196.00 per month.

The Defendant

testified that those expenses include the expenses attendant to
herself, her two children, and the two grandchildren residing in
her home.

The expenses related to the two grandchildren are not

relevant to, nor should they be considered in, the Court' s award
of alimony and child support.
9.

Premised and predicated upon the total gross

compensation of the Plaintiff (including bonuses and car
-3g:\wpl\213\00001bsr.W51

allowance) of $150,120.00 and further premised and predicated
upon the fact that the Defendant is currently unemployed and
currently has no income, reasonable child support to be paid by
Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of the two (2) children
is $1, 600.00 per month.

The income level of the Plaintiff

exceeds the guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann. §7845-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be a reasonable sum.
Given the Plaintiff s current income and the fact that the
Defendant is not currently employed and is without income and
given the debts and expenses of the parties, most of which must
be paid by the Plaintiff and given the needs of the Plaintiff
and the Defendant, reasonable alimony to be paid by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant is $1, 400. 00 per month.
10.

The Plaintiff has available to him through his

place of employment, health and accident insurance coverage for
the benefit of the minor children.
11.

The 1991 federal and state income tax returns

have not been filed but it is to the benefit of the parties that
they cooperate and file joint returns for calendar year 1991.
12.

The Plaintiff has, or can obtain, insurance upon

his life with unencumbered death benefits in the amount of
$150,000.00 and it is in the interest of the children that he do
-4g:\wpI\213\00001bsr.W51

so for purposes of providing support for the children in the
event of Plaintiff s untimely death.
13.

The assets and (liabilities) of the parties

accumulated and incurred during the marriage and currently
outstanding and an equitable division thereof is as follows:
No.

Description

Mrs, Baker

(a)

Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way

(b)

Mortgage on residence

(c)

Household furnishings and

Mr. Baker
$183,000.00
(143,000.00)

fixtures at residence

$15,000.00

(d)

2 3/4 acres i n P r i c e , Utah

(e)

1990 Ford Bronco o p e r a t e d

15,000.00
6,000.00

by Mrs. Baker

17,000.00

(f)

Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00)

(g)

1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker

(h)

Purchase debt on 1991 GMC

(i)

1989 Ford Bronco

(j)

Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco

(k)

Horse - 2 year filly

2,000.00

(1)

Horse - D. B. Cooper

1,500.00

(m)

Garden, power & hand tools

2,000.00

(n)

Tack for horses

400.00

(o)

U.S. Savings Bonds

600.00

.

(19,000.00)
12,000.00
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18,000.00

(10,800.00)

(p)
(q)

K - p l u s l o a n no.
P a c i f i c Power

1 owing t o
(1,762.00)

K-plus loan no. 2 - --..ng to
Pacific Power

(926.00)

(r)

Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents

(s)

Loan payable to Pacific Power

(t)

Payable to Dr. Hicks

(u)

Payable to Olivette Furniture

(v)

Estimated attorney' s fees for
Mr. Baker
Estimated attorney' s fees for
Mrs. Baker

(w)
(x)

(6,700.00)
(560.00)

Clothing and personal effects
each party - not valued NET VALUES

(y)

(94,389.00)

(2,000.00)

(2,500.00)
(2,500.00)
NV

NV

617, 500. 00 Sf 43. 637. 00)

Together with an equal division between the parties of
all 40IK, pension and retirement funds of both parties
per appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations and other
necessary orders.
14.

The obligation set forth in subparagraph (r) of

paragraph 14 above, which is a loan repayable to the Plaintiff s
parents in the amount of $94, 389. 00 (which does not include any
interest), is a marital debt of the parties which must be
considered in the division of the marital estate and which
accordingly reduces the marital net worth of the parties to a
negative net worth.

The debt was incurred from time to time
-6-
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commencing in 1984 and some payments have been made thereon as
evidenced by Defendant' s Exhibit 3.

Since Plaintiff is charged

with the responsibility for repayment of that debt to
Plaintiff's parents, the division of the marital net worth, as
provided for in paragraph 14 above, leaves the Plaintiff with a
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets being awarded
to the Defendant have a positive net worth of $17,500.00.

The

Court finds this imbalance to be necessary and equitable because
the Plaintiff is the only party who has earnings with which the
liabilities of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 14 above,
can be paid.
15.

While there was some evidence that Defendant' s

parents have, during the course of the marriage, provided some
support to the Plaintiff and Defendant, there was no evidence
that it was other than a gift and there was no evidence that
Defendant' s parents expected the repayment thereof.
16.

At the time of trial, the Plaintiff had in his

bank account the approximate sum of $12,000.00 resulting from
receipt by him of a recent bonus.

The $12,000.00 is not

scheduled as a separate asset because it is part of and included
in Plaintiff s income stream of $150, 120.00.
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17.

Because of the substantial debt of the parties

and the resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford
to maintain and make the mortgage payments on the residence at
11718 S. Eureka Way and the same must be sold at the earliest
possible time.

The parties stipulated that the marital

residence has a value of $183, 000. 00.

Pending sale, it is

reasonable that the Defendant be permitted temporary possession
of said real property.
approximately $1,665.00.

The monthly mortgage obligation is
Pending sale, it is reasonable that

the Defendant pay $1,000.00 of that monthly mortgage obligation
and the Plaintiff pay the balance of the mortgage until October
1, at which time, if the home is not yet sold, the Defendant
should pay the entire mortgage obligation.

During the period

that the Plaintiff is contributing to the mortgage obligation,
it is reasonable that the alimony be reduced to the rate of
$1,200.00 per month.
18.

The parties stipulated (and the Court finds the

stipulation reasonable) to the effect that Plaintiff would pay
to the Defendant, for the use and benefit of her attorneys, an
additional sum of $2,500.00 which is in addition to the previous
attorney' s fees paid by the Plaintiff for the benefit and use of
the Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00.
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19.

The parties stipulated that commencing with

calendar year 1992 and thereafter and for so long as Plaintiff
has completely paid and discharged his obligation for child
support, Plaintiff would be entitled to take and claim the minor
child, Dannie, as a dependent exemption deduction upon
Plaintiff s federal and state income tax returns and that
Defendant would be entitled to take and claim the minor child,
Camille Ann, as a dependent exemption deduction upon her federal
and state income tax returns.

j

Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court now makes
and enters its

I
j

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

!
i

20.

The parties are each entitled and should each be

i

granted a Judgment and Decree divorcing each party from the
other.
21.

The Defendant should be granted the care, custody j

and control of the two (2) minor children who are issue of the
marriage.

There should be reserved to the Plaintiff, liberal

and generous visitation rights.
22.

The Court should make and enter its Judgment and

Decree of Divorce and Order, consistent with and including and
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embracing the matters that are set forth and implicit within the
foregoing Findings of Fact and resulting equitably therefrom.
DATED this

[to day o f ^ S S , 1992.
BY THE COURT

Davxd S. Young^ Judo^A
APPROVED AS-'TO.

-y/MijL
Williams
Y for Defendant
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APPENDIX B

TJ-.is'd Judicial District

APR 1 6 1992
CnL! u A r \ i ^ ****** • '
CiPw^/ C'.o«

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
James P. Cowley (073 9)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
S a l t Lake City, Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 2 - 3 3 3 3
I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

Q\r7^T70T7

DAN BAKER,

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE

vs.

Civil No. 914902633DA
LUJUANA BAKER,
Judge David S. Young
Defendant.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young,
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on
Thursday, March 26, 1992.
Exhibits were received.
on the record.

The parties were sworn and testified.
The parties entered into a stipulation

The Court has heretofore made and entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based upon the matters

on file herein, the testimony of the parties, the Exhibits
received into evidence, the stipulation of the parties and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered in

&C-*>llm

Ofl *C\\ u

this matter and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and
enters this Judgment and Decree of Divorce:
1.

The parties are each given and granted a Judgment

and Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony and
divorcing each from the other.

This divorce shall be final upon

entry of this Judgment.
2.

There is awarded to the Defendant the care,

custody and control of the two minor children who are issue of
the marriage, to wit:
Camille Ann born Jan. 4, 1983, 9 years of age
Dannie born December 5, 1983, 8 years of age
There is reserved to the Plaintiff liberal and
generous rights of visitation, including the right to visit with
the children at all reasonable times and places and not less
than the amount established in the visitation policy adopted by
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

The Defendant shall keep the Plaintiff informed

as to the health, education, welfare and social and religious
development of the children and the Plaintiff shall have open
and free access to the health, education and religious records
of the children.

The Defendant shall consult with and advise

the Plaintiff about major decisions that affect the children.
Without diminishing Defendant' s authority and responsibility as
-2g:\wpl\213\00001bsr.W51

the custodial parent, she shall listen to and consider
recommendations and suggestions of the Plaintiff with respect to
the children.

Neither party shall, by word or conduct,

denigrate the other to or in the presence of the children and
each party shall encourage an open, free and loving relationship
between the children and the other party.
3.

The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as child

support, for the use and benefit of the two (2) minor children,
the sum of $1, 600. 00 per month, commencing with the month of
April 1992.

Eight hundred dollars ($800.00) thereof shall be

payable on or before the 5th day of each month and the other
$800.00 shall be payable on or before the 20th day of each
month.

In addition to the child support herein provided for,

the Plaintiff shall, for so long as he has a duty to pay child
support, maintain insurance upon his life with unencumbered
death benefits in the amount of $150,000.00 payable at the
option of the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the children, their
guardian or a corporate trustee for the use and benefit of the
children.
4.

The Plaintiff shall maintain health and accident

insurance for the use and benefit of the children.

The

Defendant shall pay all uninsured, routine medical and dental
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expenses, including r o u t i n e office v i s i t s , examinations and
immunizations.

The p a r t i e s s h a l l each pay one-half (1/2) of a l l

other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and d e n r a l
expenses.

The P l a i n t i f f s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o take a c r e d i t

against his child support obligation i n an amount equal t o the
cost i n c u r r e d by him i n maintaining the h e a l t h and a c c i d e n t
insurance for the b e n e f i t of the children.

The P l a i n t i f f

shall

provide t h e Defendanr with w r i t t e n v e r i f i c a t i o n by his employer
e s t a b l i s h i n g the c o s t incurred by the P l a i n t i f f for maintaining
health and accident insurance for the c h i l d r e n only.
5.

Commencing with the month of April 1992, the

P l a i n t i f f shall pay t o the Defendant, as alimony, the sum of
$1,200.00 per month.

Commencing with the month a f t e r t h e month

i n which the r e s i d e n t i a l property r e f e r r e d t o in paragraph 9
below i s sold or with t h e month of October 19 92 (whichever
occurs f i r s t ) , the alimony herein provided for shall be
increased t o the sum of $1,400.00 per month.

One-half

(1/2) of

the alimony shall be payable on or before t h e 5th day of each
month and one-half (1/2) s h a l l be payable on or before t h e 20th
day of each month.

The alimony herein provided for s h a l l

terminate upon the f i r s t of the following events:
a.

The death of e i t h e r p a r t y ;
-4-
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b.

The remarriage of the Defendant;

c.

Cohabitation by the Defendant under

circumstances t h a t would cause alimony t o be terminated i n
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
6.

The alimony and child support herein provided for

i s premised and p r e d i c a t e d upon currenr t o t a l gross compensation
of the P l a i n t i f f

(including bonuses and c a r allowance) of

$150, 120. 00 per year and i s further premised and p r e d i c a t e d on
the fact thai: while t h e Defendant i s a t r a i n e d ,

educated,

q u a l i f i e d and c e r t i f i e d school teacher, she i s c u r r e n t l y
unemployed and p r e s e n t l y has no income.
7.

For each calendar year (commencing with calendar

year 1992 and t h e r e a f t e r ) t h a t the P l a i n t i f f has completely paid
and discharged his o b l i g a t i o n for child support, P l a i n t i f f

shall

be e n t i t l e d to take and claim the minor c h i l d , Dannie, as a
dependent exemption deduction upon P l a i n t i f f 7 s federal and s t a t e
income t a x returns.
8.

The p a r t i e s s h a l l cooperate with each*' o t h e r and

the Defendant s h a l l furnish information t o the P l a i n t i f f
necessary t o complete the 1991 federal and s t a t e income tax
returns.

I f there i s a net refund of both the federal and s t a t e

income t a x e s , then f i f t y percent (50%) of the net refund shall
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belong to the Plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) shall belong to
the Defendant.

If further federal and state taxes are due for

calendar year 1991, the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge the
same.
9.

The residence of the parties at 11718 South

Eureka Way, South Jordan, Utah, is awarded to the Plaintiff, who
shall immediately list the same for sale with a real estate
broker.

Pending the sale of the subject property, the Defendant

and the minor children shall reside therein and shall care for
and maintain the premises.

Commencing with the month of April

1992 and continuing through the month of September 1992, or
until the property is sold (whichever occurs first), the
Defendant shall pay upon the mortgage indebtedness on said
property the sum of $1,000.00 per month and the Plaintiff shall,
each month during said time period, pay the balance of the
mortgage payment.

If the property has not been sold by the end

of September 1992, then thereafter and commencing with the month
of October 1992, the Defendant shall make the full -monthly
mortgage payment on said property until the same is sold.

The

award of the residential property is subject to the mortgage
thereon which (except as otherwise provided herein), shall be
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paid and discharged by the P l a i n t i f f who s h a l l save and hold the
Defendant harmless therefrom.
10.

The household furnishings,

fixtures,

appliances

and personal property located in the r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y may be
used by the Defendant and minor children for so long as they
r e s i d e i n the property.

At such time as t h e Defendant vacates

the property, the p a r t i e s s h a l l divide t h e furnishings,
fixtures,

appliances and personal property between them on an

equal b a s i s .
11.

By a s e p a r a t e l y entered and appropriate Qualified

Domestic Relation Order(s), there s h a l l be divided e q u a l l y
between t h e p a r t i e s , a l l pension, p r o f i t sharing,

retirement,

IRA, t h r i f t plans, savings plans and other such b e n e f i t s and
plans i n which the p a r t i e s have an i n t e r e s t (s) and t h e value (s)
thereof as of the d a t e hereof.
12.

There i s awarded to the Defendant as h e r sole and

s e p a r a t e property, her jewelry, clothing and personal

effects,

t o g e t h e r with the 1990 Ford Bronco operated by the Defendant.
The award to the Defendant of the motor v e h i c l e herein described
i s s u b j e c t to a debt thereon i n the approximate amount of
$14,500.00 payable t o P l a i n t i f f ' s c r e d i t union at the r a t e of
$396. 00 per month.

Commencing with the month of April 1992, the
-7-
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Defendant shall promptly pay, when due, the monthly payments to
the credit union until said indebtedness has been discharged.
13.

The Defendant shall pay and discharge all debrs

and liabilities incurred by her since the separation of the
parties in May, 1991, and not otheirwise provided for herein and
she shall save and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
14.

In addition to the family residence referred to

in paragraph 9 above, the Plaintiff is awarded as his sole and
separate property, the following specific assets:
a.

Approximately 2% acres of undeveloped land

b.

A 1991 GMC operated by the Plaintiff,

in Price, Utah;

subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of
$19,000.00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge;
c.

A 1989 Ford Bronco operated by the Plaintiff

subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of
$10,800. 00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge;
d.

A horse identified as a 2 year old filly;

e.

A horse identified as D. B. Cooper;

f.

All of the tack and related equipment for

g.

The garden, power and hand tools;

the horses;
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h.

U. S. Savings Bonds w i t h a value of

a p p r o x i m a t e l y $600.00;
i.
personal

The P l a i n t i f f s c l o t h i n g , jewelry and

effects;
j.

A bonus and promotion payment r e c e n t l y

r e c e i v e d by the P l a i n t i f f

i n c i d e n t t o h i s 1991 employment i n t h e

n e t sum of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $12,000.00;
15.

The P l a i n t i f f

s h a l l pay and d i s c h a r g e t h e

f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l d e b t s and o b l i g a t i o n s and s h a l l s a v e and
hold t h e Defendant h a r m l e s s
a.
b.
c.

therefrom:

K-plus l o a n no. 1 owing t o
P a c i f i c Power

(1,762.00)

K-plus l o a n no. 2 owing t o
P a c i f i c Power

(926.00)

Loan payable t o Mr. and Mrs.
Paul Baker

(94,389.00)

d.

Loan payable to Pacific Power

e.

Payable to Dr. Hicks

f.
g.

Payable to Olivette Furniture
Plaintiff s attorney' s fees and
costs incurred in this action

h.

Payable to Defendant' s attorney
in this action to apply upon
attorney' s fees and costs incurred
by the Defendant in this action
(2,500.00)
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(6,700.00)
(560.00)
(2,000.00)

i.

16.

The P l a i n t i f f s h a l l pay and
discharge a l l debts and l i a b i l i t i e s
incurred by him since t h e separ a t i o n of the p a r t i e " i n May,
1991, and not otherwise provided
for herein and he s h a l l save and
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.

The p a r t i e s are ordered and directed t o take such

a c t i o n and make and execute a l l such documents and do such
things as are necessary t o implement the provisions hereof.
17.

An O r d e r t o W i t h h o l d and D e l i v e r Income s h a l l

e n t e r e d when, and i f ,
support: o b l i g a t i o n ,
procedures

D e f e n d a n t becomes d e l i n q u e n t i n
and a p p r o p r i a t e income

Office

be submitted t o t h e Court,

U t a h Code Ann.
DATED t h i s

/fc

day of M&rcS

1992.

BY THE COURT

and

or t o

o f R e c o v e r y S e r v i c e s u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s of

e t seq. ,

his

withholding

s h a l l a p p l y t o e x i s t i n g and f u t u r e p a y o r s ,

w i t h h e l d income s h a l l

be

all

the

§62A-11-401

APPENDIX C

PLAINTIFF'S EARNINGS AND PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED
ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION THEREOF
Annual
Plaintiff's current gross annual income
Includes car allowance of $7,800 and
average bonus
Less FICA withheld
Withholding for health and accident insurance
Withholding for accidental death
Withholding for dental insurance
Withholding for life insurance
Withholding for vision insurance
Car payment on GMC at $452.00 per month
Car payment on Bronco at $264.00 per month
Monthly payment to Olivette Furniture - $200.00
Repayment of K-plus no. 1 loan @ $135.00 per month
Repayment of K-plus no. 2 loan @ $57.00 per month
Pay Dr. Hicks at $25.00 per month
Payment to Paul Baker at $750.00 per month
Pay Pacific Power at $400.00 per month
Child support for two children at $1,600.00
per month

$150,120.00
(5,115.00)
(468.00)
(210.00)
(192.00)
(821.00)
(120.00)
(5,424.00)
(3,168.00)
(2,400.00)
(1,620.00)
(684.00)
(300.00)
(12,000.00)
(4,800.00)

Balance available for tax and support of the parties

$ 93,514.00

Suggested alimony for Mrs. Baker at $1,400.00
per month

(16,800.00)

(19,284.00)

Federal and state taxes payable by Mr. Baker
calculated as follows:
Gross income
Less alimony
Less 2 personal exemptions
and itemized deductions
Taxable income
Federal and state tax at
combined estimated rate
Federal & state income tax

$150,120.00
(16,800.00)
(5,000.00)
$128,320.00
x.33
($42,345.00)

Net cash available for Mr. Baker

($34,009.00)
Monthly
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$ 2,834.00

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT^

Month

Annual

Net cash for Mrs. Baker and children
Child support
Alimony
With alimony and child
with Mrs. Baker filing
taking the children as
incur Federal or State
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$1,600.00
1,400.00
;3,00Q.00
support at this level and
as head of household and
exemptions, she will not
income tax liabilities.

$19,284.00
16,800.00
$36,084.00

APPENDIX D

BAKER vs. BAKER
Civil No. 9149Q2633DA
DEFENDANT'S MONTHLY INCOME & EXPENSES
GROSS INCOME

Salary / Wages

$ -0-

EXPENSES
Rent/Mortgage:
Real Property Taxes:
Real Property Insurance:
Maintenance:
Food/Household supplies:
Utilities including water,
electricity, gas & heat:
Telephone:
Laundry/Cleaning:
Clothing:
Medical:
Dental:
Insurance:
Child Care:
Payment of child/spousal support
re prior marriage:
School:
Entertainment:
Incidentals:
Transportation:
Auto expenses:
Auto payments:
Installment payments:
Other expenses:
atty, fees
cable
newspaper
therapist

$1.,576.00

TOTAL EXPENSES:
* - plaintiff is currently paying

$
$
$
$

incl.
incl.
75.00
750.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

300.00
100.00
70.00
400.00
50.00
50.00
-0260.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-050.00
481.00
200.00

$
$
$
$

100.00
50.00
8.00
20.00

$

4,800.00

260.00
*
*

APPENDIX E

BAKER VS. BAKER
Civil No. 914902633DA
PAUL BAKER LOAN
Payment History
DATE
07/01/84
07/15/84

$
$

08/01/84
08/01/84

$
$

08/16/84
09/10/84

$

09/29/84
10/20/84

$

11/10/84
11/20/84

$

11/22/84
01/14/85

$

$

$

$

$

03/16/85
11/01/87

$

12/01/87

$

02/07/88
03/08/88
12/30/91

$

$

$
$

18 payments §

TOTAL:

Loan begin date

02/15/84

Loan total borrowed

$98,314•00

Loan balance

$94,398.00

$

APPENDIX F

STATEMENT OF ASSETS & (LIABILITIES)
AND
PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED DIVISION THEREOF
Item
No.

Description

1.

Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way-

$183,000.00

2.

Mortgage on residence

(143,000.00)

3.

Household furnishings and
fixtures at residence

4.

2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah

5.

1990 Ford Bronco operated
by Mrs. Baker

Mrs. Baker

$15,000.00

Mr. Baker

15,000.00
6,000.00

17,000.00

6.
Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00)
18,000.00

7.
1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker

(19,000.00)

8.
Purchase debt on 1991 GMC

12,000.00

9.
1989 Ford Bronco

(10,800.00)

10.
Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco

2,000.00

11.
Horse - 2 year filly

1,500.00

12.
Horse - D.B. Cooper

2,000.00

13.
Garden, power & hand tools

400.00

14.
Tack for horses

600.00

15.
16.
17.

U.S. Savings Bonds
K-plus loan no. 1 owing to
Pacific Power

(1,762.00)

K-plus loan no. 2 owing to
Pacific Power

(926.00)

18.

Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents

19.

Loan payable to Pacific Power

20.

Payable to Dr. Hicks

21.

Payable to Olivette Furniture
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(94,389.00)
(6,700.00)
(560.00)
(2,000.00

22.
23.
24.
25.

Estimated attorney's fees for
Mr. Baker

(2,500.00)

Estimated attorney's fees for
Mrs, Baker

(2,500.00)

Loan payable to Defendant's
paremts
Clothing and personal effects
each party - not valued NET VALUES

(33,000.00)
NV

NV

($15,500.00) $(43,637.00)

Together with an equal divisi< n of all 401K, pension and
retirement funds of both parties per appropriate Qualified
Domestic Relations and other orders.
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APPENDIX 6

DAN BAKER v. LUJUANA BAKER

SCHEDULE OF MARITAL ASSETS
and
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
ESTIMATED
FAIR MARKET
VALUE

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION
DEFENDANT
P3AINTIFF

ASSETS:
Real Estate
11718 S. Eureka Way
Price acreage

$ 183,000
6,000

$

Retirement Accounts
401(k) and ESOP

$

60,000*

$

$

30,000
2,000

$

Other Assets
Household Furnishings
Power and Hand Tools
Motor Vehicles
1989 Ford Bronco
1990 Ford Bronco
1991 GMC
Horses (2)
Tack
U.S. Savings Bonds
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS:

11,150
12,400
19,000
3,500
400
800
$ 328,250

183,000
3,000

32,199

$

27,801

15,000
2,000

$

15,000
—
...

11,150

12,400

—

19,000
3,500
400
400

—
—
——

400
242,601

$

85,649

$

$

20,000

($

$ 328,250

$

106,649

$

221,601

$ 143,000
11,600
14,000
18,500
1,762
926
6,700
560
2,000

$

$

143,000

Plaintiff's Lien on Eureka Way
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS:

$

3,000

20,000)

LIABILITIES:
Mortgage (Eureka Way)
1989 Bronco
1990 Bronco
GMC
K Plus Loan 1
K Plus Loan 2
Pacific Power
Dr. Hicks
Olivette Furniture
SUBTOTAL LIABILITIES:
NET MARITAL ASSETS:

—

11,600
—

14,000
——
——
_—
—
—
—

18,500
1,762
926
6,700
560
2,000

($ 199,048)

($ 42,048)
1

($

157,000)

$ 131,202

$ 64,601

$

64,601

* approximate value, funds to be used to equalize distribution of
marital estate
Each party to pay debts incurred in his or her own name since separation
Each party to pay any debts associated with his or her parents

